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This paper performs lower boundary condition tests based on rational pricing of call options 
and an implied standard deviation test based on the bid/ask prices of options. These effÉciency tests 
attempt to closely approximate conditions in the option markets to avoid the pitfalls indicated 
by Phillips and Smith (1980). The tests use transactions data and account for the effects of stock 
and option bid/ask prices, simultaneity of stock and option prices, depth of market, execution 
lag and transaction costs. The small and relatively infrequent profits due to market mispricing 
disappear in the lower boundary tests when transaction costs are taken into account. Frequent 
violations of the tighter boundary conditions in the implied standard deviation test are 
reported, but the estimated profits cannot be unambiguously attributed to option market 
inefficiency. 
1. Introduction 
Tests of market  efficiency have, in the past, been conducted at several 
levels of rigor. Those which avoid confounding  jo in t  tests of hypotheses 
while closely approximat ing  the market 's  operat ional  constraints  are more 
rigorous than those that do not. Therefore, a greater probabil i ty  of realizing 
the reported extra economic profits, if any, may be ascribed to the former 
category of tests. This paper describes such rigorous tests for call opt ions 
traded on the Chicago Board Opt ions  Exchange (CBOE). 
In testing opt ion market  efficiency, two issues are crucial: (a) s imultanei ty 
of opt ion price and  under ly ing stock price data, and  (b) 'error free' 
measurement  of the input  parameters,  notably,  the variance of the under lying 
stock return. Further ,  since an opt ion is generally bought  at its ask price and 
sold at its bid price, one must  consider the bid/ask spread in an efficiency 
*This research was supported in part by a summer research grant from the Graduate School 
of Business Administration at the University of Michigan. 1 would like to acknowledge the help 
of my dissertation committee: James Hoag, Mark Garman, Michael Klass and especially Mark 
Rubinstein (chairman). Thanks also to Steve Brown, Blair Hull, Richard Rendleman, Adrian 
Tschoegl and the referee, Clifford Smith, for their comments; and Interactive Data Corporation 
for the T-bill rate data. I remain solely responsible for all errors. 
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test. ~ Otherwise, ex-post trading rules may "systematically pick out, as 
undervalued, call prices from transactions initiated by orders to sell" [-Phillips 
and Smith (1980, p. 186)]. Finally, depth of the market, that is, number of 
option contracts traded at a given price, is relevant to determine whether an 
additional trade could have been executed at thai price to exploit mispricing 
of an option. 
None of the previous work considers the option bid/ask spread or the 
depth of the market. Transactions costs are either ignored or dismissed as 
being insignificant when, in fact, they can be quite substantial. Except for 
Galai (1977,1978) and Klemkosky and Resnick (1980) in the context of 
put/call parity, all previous researchers ignore the time lag in acting upon a 
profit opportunity indicated by a mispricing signal. 
This paper tests, with modifications, the rational boundary conditions for 
call options developed by Merton (1973)and Galai (1978t. e-~* In addition, a 
convexity test on calls, using butterfly spreads, is performed, s A new 
spreading test based on relative mispricing between calls of identical 
maturities but differing strike prices written on the same underlying stock, is 
proposed and performed. It is argued that excess profit situations may exist 
when the ranges of the standard deviations of the underlying stock returns 
implied by the bid/ask prices of the two options, that is, the d<d, to (~aski 
range and the ")b~d~ to d~,~k, range, do not overlap. 
Transactions data for 58 CBOE option classes l\~r 196 option trading days 
tTrades which occur inside the bid ask spread are discussed later. 
-'Black and Scholes (1972). Galai (1977). and lqnnertv (197S) test option market efficiency, bv 
identifying mispriced options using the Black Scholes (1973) fi~rmula. They' use historical stock 
returns to estimate the variance of the underlying stock. For a crilique of this approach, see 
Bhattacharya (19g0), and Boyle and Emanuel (19g0). The other approach employed by [,atane 
and Rendleman (1976), Trippi (1977), and Chiras and Manaster  (1978) consists of implying the 
xariance parameter from option prices and using it in an option valuation model to identil~, 
arbitrage opportunities. Most of the comments  cited above arc also applicable here. 
Furthermore, these variance estimates are no! unique and require simultaneous stock and option 
price data. Thus the daily, weekly or monthly data used may not be adequate. 
~While the proposed tests are free from measurement error with respect to a and r, and arc 
not dependent on the biases of any particular wduation model, they are sensitive to data 
problems, especially with regard to simultaneity, measurement  of the option price, and depth of 
the market. 
aGalai (1978) initially performs the boundary condition tests for calls using daily closing prices 
for options and their underlying stocks. To avoid the selection bias associated with ex-post tests 
he allows a one-day execution lag in buying an underpriced option. To address the non- 
simultaneity problem, he uses hourly data for one month on three options and allows one hour 
for execulion lag. Rendleman and Carabini {1979) and Phillips and Smith (1980) suggest that the 
magnitude of the violations of Ihe lower boundary condition documented by Galai can be 
attributed to his not considering the bid/ask spread on the call prices. Furthermore, in the 
absence of data about the depth of the market at each price it is not clear whether the 
mispricing signals could, in fact, have been translated into excess profits. 
Sl was informed of Galai's (1975) working paper which perlk~rms this test on daily closing 
prices on options traded between April 26, 1973 and November 30. 1973, a few months  alter the 
first draft of this paper was completed. 
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ending June 2, 1977, are used in this s tudy)  The raw data base contained 
every reported bid/ask and transaction price record for each option for each 
day, along with the transaction volume and the last traded stock price. Each 
record is time stamped to the nearest second. This is the first time that such 
a large data base with, as will be seen later, nearly contemporaneous stock 
and option prices has been employed for efficiency tests of option markets. 
2. The proposed tests 
2.1. Call boundary conditions 
Merton (1973) derived the rational lower boundary conditions for call 
prices with respect to their underlying stock prices. Although these are weak 
conditions on the call price, they are appealing because they imply 
hypotheses which can be tested without estimating any parameter for the 
stock or option return distribution. Galai (1978) derived the boundary 
conditions for exchange listed American calls. For these dividend 
'unprotected' calls which can be exercised any time until maturity, including 
the last moment before the stock goes ex-dividend, the early exercise 
dominance condition for multiple dividends over the life of the option is 
C(S,K,z,D,r')>-max(O, max(S-Ke-r~' ~, . j<, e "~J),S-Ke r~_ ~ D e ~"~ 
(1) 
where C is the value of an unprotected American call; S is the stock price; K 
is the strike price; r is the continuously compounded interest rate; T is the 
maturity date; t is the current date; z = T - t  is the time to maturity; r' is the 
vector of time to ex-dividend dates tl,t2 ..... t,; and D is the vector of 
dividend amounts D,,, D,2 .. . . .  Dr. It is assumed that D and r' are both known 
with. certainty. In words, (1) says that the value of an American call not 
protected for dividends is not less than the maximum of (a) the highest of the 
European call values for the option computed at each dividend date just 
before the stock goes ex-dividend, and (b) the European call value assuming 
that the call will be held to expiration. Eq. (1) tends to understate the 
American call value because it ignores the flexibility of the American option 
in allowing early exercise in the event of a sudden large change in the stock 
price [Cox and Rubinstein (1983)]. 
°The data base originall~ contained 95 option classes. In keeping with the assumption that 
dividend amounts  and ex-dividend dates are known with certainty, stocks which paid special 
cash dividends or had stock dividends or stock splits were exchrded from the data. Thirty-seven 
option classes were thus excluded. 
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For  a call expected to be held until maturity,  7 
C > S - K e  -r~-  ~ D,e  r~, (2) 
i - I  
For  a non-dividend paying stock, this collapses to 
C(S, K, r, 0) = c(S, K, r) > max (0, S - K e r~), /3) 
which is Merton 's  result that an American call with no dividends on the 
stock will not be exercised prior to maturity.  Thus, it is effectively equivalent 
to an European  call, c. 
A testable hypothesis for well synchronized stock and option markets is 
that  e, defined as the r ight-hand side of (1) less its left hand side, is not  less 
than zero. Similar hypotheses can be derived from 12) and (3), 
In the above equat ions the call price is the equilibrium price. However,  to 
buy a call, one would have to pay the ask price, which is higher than the 
equilibrium price. 8 Therefore, the appropr ia te  test for, say, the European 
boundary  condit ion consists of substituting Cask for C in (2), thereby 
lowering the rational pricing bound. 
When the stock bid/ask is also considered, the boundary  condit ion for a 
call expected to be held until maturi ty becomes 
C a s k ~ S a s k _ _ K e  rr ~ D,e r~, (4) 
i - I  
Two additional market  constraints need to be met before call mispricing 
can be translated into arbitrage profits. First, a market  maker  is obliged to 
buy/sell only one contract  at his bid/ask quote. Therefore, only when the 
volume of trade at the specific price where a boundary  violation is observed 
is non-zero may one assume that an additional contract  could have been 
traded (bought) at that  price. Second, the trade initiator incurs transactions 
costs. 9 
2.2. Tests of option spreads 
Two spreading tests will be proposed in this section: (a) the butterfly 
spread test, which is also a boundary  condit ion test involving relative prices 
~This result has also been derived in Smith (1976). 
8Smidt (1979) attributes the premium over equilibrium price Io cover market makers' 
informational disadvantage against an informationally motivated trader. Benston and Hagerman 
(1978) suggest it to be compensation for the market makers" inability to diversify their trading 
portfolio. 
9Transaction cost magnitudes are discussed in the next section. 
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of three options on the same underlying stock; and (b) the vertical spread 
between two options on the same stock based on their implied standard 
deviations. 
Option spreading strategies are attractive because they do not involve 
trading in any other type of security, possibly on another exchange. 
Consequently, transactions costs are low to the members of the option 
exchange. Spreading also avoids the difficulties associated with lags in 
information flow from other exchanges and in execution of orders placed on 
other exchanges. 
2.2.1. Call convexity condition 
Call prices are convex in the striking price for identical maturity options 
on the same underlying stock. That is, 
C(S, K 2, r) < qC(S, K 1, z) + (1 - q)C(S, K 3, z), 15) 
where q is defined by K 2 = q K I + ( 1 - q ) K  3 with values 0 < q < l ,  and 
K1 < K 2 < K 3  are the strike prices. 
Arbitrage profit can be realized due to violations of this condition through 
a 'butterfly spread', that is, writing calls with exercise prices K1 and K 3 and 
buying the intermediate call. 
Considering the bid/ask of the options, (5) becomes 
Cask(K2) --< qCbid( K 1) + (1 -- q)Cbid(g3). (6) 
Clearly, simultaneity of the option prices is crucial here. Although it is 
impossible to obtain all observations at exactly the same instant, intra-day 
prices on the three options within time spans when the stock price remains 
unchanged is sufficient/° 
2.2.2. Spread test based on implied volatility 
Consider two options of identical maturity, on the same underlying stock, 
but with differing exercise prices which are not far apart. Since the maturities 
are identical, equilibrium prices of the two options should imply the same 
standard deviation of stock returns. 11 However, the implied standard 
deviations need not be exactly equal because buying and selling prices differ. 
Only when the range of the standard deviations implied by the bid and the 
1°See footnote 19 for elaboration on the time span over which the stock price is unchanged. 
11This assumes that neither option is exercised prematurely. I am grateful to Cliff Smith for 
this point. 
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ask prices of option 1 does not overlap the corresponding range for option 2, 
that is, if 6-b~d, to da~k, is disjoint from tibia, to 6,~k~, and if this disjointness 
persists when mapped into prices, is riskless arbitrage theoretically possible. 
In such a case we could buy an option at its ask price, and sell an 
appropriate amount of the other at its bid price, and still make a profit. ~2 
Given Sbia and S~k correspondingto  Cbia,, C~k,, Chad, and C,,~k~, we could 
solve for 
(Tbidi = ./'(Sbicl, Cbidi' K i ,  r ,  r),  (7) 
and 
d,,~k=l'{Sa~k, Ca~k,Ki, r,r), i = 1  9 18) 
Here d estimate is relatively free from estimation error in that it is not 
exogenously specified, nor is it a (weighted) combination of the several 
estimates available. 13 Of course, use of the B S formula to compute the 
implied a introduces a joint hypothesis about the biases of the B-S formula. 
Thus our model dependent joint test seeks to establish tighter call pricing 
boundary constraints than those due to rational (arbitrage free) pricing of 
calls. 
For dividend paying stocks eq, (1) will be used to compute the standard 
deviation ranges. This overstates the implied standard deviations. For a small 
sample of options Beckers (1978) reports that the differences between the 
implied standard deviations obtained from eq. (1t and the Cox et al. (19791 
binomial option pricing model may be as high as 10 percent. Nevertheless, to 
reduce computational costs, the B S formula with escrowed dividends 
adjustment will be used for dividend paying stocks. 
3. Transaction costs 
Phillips and Smith (1980) documented the ranges of transaction costs 
individual investors, option market makers, and arbitrageurs incur when they 
initiate trades in either stocks or options, x4 They confirm the relatively high 
transaction costs incurred by an individual investor, but refute the 
assumption of several previous researchers that market maker transaction 
~2For two options m and n, 
(]cask,(~Sas k -  N(dl)~ sk and ?,cbid/~Sbid=N(dO b'a. 
The neutral hedge ratio for the spread consists of buying N(d~)~d/Ntdl)~ ~k contracts of n for each 
contract of m sold. This assumes that returns series S~ k and Sba a are Weiner processes. 
~3See footnote 2. 
~ F o r  another estimate of option market makers" transaction costs, see Rendleman and 
Carabini I 1979). 
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COSTS are negligible. 15 Clearly, the larger the transaction costs, the wider the 
band within which prices can fluctuate without creating arbitrage 
opportunities. Studies which ignore transaction costs but reject the null 
hypotheses of either well synchronized stock and option markets or option 
market efficiency may overestimate the degree of non-synchronization or 
market inefficiency. 
This paper considers the above issues from the position of the most 
advantageously placed trader. For trades in options alone, the most 
advantageously placed trader is the option market maker; for trades 
involving stocks it is the arbitrageur. 16' 17 
The higher the commission generated for a clearing firm by a market 
maker, the lower his transaction cost. Therefore, although the Phillips and 
Smith estimates (i.e., 0.50-1.00/option contract and $5.00 12.50/round lot of 
stock incurred by an option market maker) are generally true, some high 
volume market makers currently pay $0.36/option contract and an average 
of about $4.50/round lot of stock. Arbitrageurs' trading costs are estimated 
to be about $0.80 per option contract and $l.00 per round lot of stock, is 
These lower estimates may be attributed to increased competition among 
clearing houses, especially from early 1980. However, in late 1976 to mid- 
1977, the sample period for this study, a high volume market maker's 
transaction costs were about $0.75/contract and $8.00/round lot. These 
estimates fall within the range estimated by Phillips and Smith and are not 
far from the Rendleman and Carabini (1979) estimates of $0.80/contract and 
$9.00/round lot of stock. For the same period the costs for arbitrageurs who 
executed their own trades in the stock were between $1.50 and $6.00 for a 
round lot and $1.50-$2.00/option contract. 
The tests proposed in the previous section will accordingly be performed 
under three separate assumptions of transaction costs. First, to make this 
study comparable with those that ignore transaction costs, I will do likewise. 
Next, option mispricing will be considered from the position of an 
arbitrageur who incurs transaction costs of $1.50 on an option contract and 
$2.00 on a round lot of stock. The final case will consider mispricing from 
the position of an option market maker whose corresponding transaction 
costs are $0.75 and $8.00. 
~SFor example, Galai (1977). 
16It is assumed that the option market maker does not have a seat on the stock exchange, 
and the arbitrageur who has a seat on the stock exchange does not perform the option market 
making function. 
~Tphillips and Smith (1980) argue that the opportunity cost of a seat on the exchange 
contributes to the market friction induced bound around the equilibrium price of a security 
traded on that exchange. While consideration of the bid/ask spread partly addresses this issue 
(section 4), the per option contract effect of the expected future cash flows due to arbitrage 
activities of the seat holders which may be impounded in the price of the seat, is not addressed. 
18I am grateful to Blair Hull for discussions on this issue. 
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4. Data 
T h e  sample  p e r i o d  for  the  s tudy  is 196 t r a d i n g  days  f r o m  A u g u s t  24, 1976 
to J u n e  12, 1977. T h e  d a t a  cons is t  of  o p t i o n s  t r an sac t i ons  de r i ved  f rom the  
C B O E  Market  Data Report ( M D R )  for 706 o p t i o n  series on  58 unde r ly ing  
s tocks . t  9.20 
N o t  all t r a n s a c t i o n s  occu r  at  the b id  o r  ask prices. A s ignif icant  pe r cen t age  
o c c u r  wi th in  the  b i d / a s k  spread.  If  i n f o r m a t i o n  were  ava i l ab le  on  whe the r  a 
t r ade  was in i t i a ted  by a buy  o r d e r  o r  by a sell o rder ,  it w o u l d  be poss ib le  to 
e s t i m a t e  the  m a r g i n a l  cost  of  l iqu id i ty  services  for an  o p t i o n  as the difference 
b e t w e e n  the  lowes t  t r a n s a c t i o n  pr ice  for a buy  o r d e r  and  the  h ighes t  
t r a n s a c t i o n  pr ice  for a sell o rder ,  for  a c o n s t a n t  level of  the s tock  price. 21 
U n f o r t u n a t e l y ,  d a t a  on  w h o  in i t ia ted  the o r d e r  are  no t  ava i lab le .  The re fo re ,  
to a v o i d  se lec t ing  t r a n s a c t i o n  prices as sell pr ices  w h e n  they cou ld  in fact  
h a v e  been  in i t i a ted  by buy  orders ,  o r  vice versa,  22 the lowes t  bid pr ice  at 
wh ich  a t r a n s a c t i o n  o c c u r r e d  is a s s u m e d  to be the bid price and  the  h ighes t  
ask pr ice  at  wh ich  t r ade  o c c u r r e d  is a s s u m e d  to be the  ask price,  for the 
g iven  level  o f  s tock  price.  O n l y  such  u n a m b i g u o u s  prices are  used in tests of  
h y p o t h e s e s  in this paper .  Ev iden t ly ,  this causes  the tests to be b iased  in f avo r  
~gSee Bhattacharya and Rubinstein (1978) for details. Briefly, the MDR contains every 
reported transaction and every reported bid/ask quote for each option. The lag between a trade 
or a new bid/ask quote occurring on the trading floor and its being recorded in the MDR is 
about 5 to 45 seconds, depending on trading activity, Late and out of sequence records are 
identified separately and are discarded. Each record contains the date, stock symbol, strike price, 
expiration date, the bid/ask quote or option price and the number of contracts traded at that 
price, the time the trade or new quote was recorded in hours, minutes and seconds and the last 
traded stock price. On an average there are more than 35,000 such records per trading day. The 
kconsolidated' form of the data base essentially contains two kinds of records. The first is a 
header record for each time span during which the stock's last traded price remained constant. 
A sample header is shown below: 
XRX 760824 4 14:34:23 14:40:37 63 1/8 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6t 
The fields are: (1) stock symbol: (2) date; (3) number of data records following this header record; 
(4) and (5) beginning and ending time over which the stock traded price was constant; (6) the 
constant stock price for the interval. 
Next are data records, one for each option on the stock with any bid/ask or trading during 
the above interval. A sample data record is: 
1 60.00 6~ 6~ 1 4 12 3 7 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
The information contained in this record is: (1) expiration month; (2) striking price; (3) lowest 
bid or transactions price and number of contracts traded at that price (5); (4) highest ask or 
transaction price and number of contracts traded at that price (6); (7) total number of contracts 
traded. In this case 1 2 - 4 - 1 = 7  contracts were traded at intermediate prices; and (9) the total 
number of raw records this data record is summarizing. This includes 3 records [see field (8)] 
which were bid/ask records occurring between 14:34:23 plus 3 seconds, i.e., 14:34:26 and 14:39:23. 
2°Table A.2 in the appendix lists the option classes used in the study. 
21See Baesel et al. (1983) for an interesting estimate of the cost to investors of the market 
making functions. 
22This is the Phillips and Smith (1980) criticism of most previous studies. 
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of the maintained hypotheses of well-synchronized option markets and 
option-market  efficiency. Not  doing so would result in a bias with 
indeterminate sign. 23 
The data do not contain the transaction price of the stock as stock trades 
occur. Rather, the latest price at which the stock has been traded (bought or 
sold) is reported only when a bid/ask change or a trade occurs in any of its 
options. Thus, stock prices on active option classes are recorded more 
frequently than those on less active option classes. Therefore, what appears 
as an unchanged stock price may have missed interim stock price movements 
up (down) and down (up) again. However, there are, on average, more than 
35,000 raw observations per day among the 95 option classes, or an average 
of more than one observation for each option class for every trading minute. 
Hence, the frequency of occurrence of the foregoing phenomenon, although 
non-zero, is not very large. 
4.1. Imputing the stock bid~ask price 
The data do not contain the bid/ask prices of the underlying stock. Table 
A.1 in the appendix presents the stock price summary records for Black and 
Decker (BDK) for August 24, 1976. Price changes between records 1, 2, and 
3 are +~, - ~ .  Between records 3, 4, 5, and 6 price changes are +~, - ~  +~. 
Again records 7, 8 and 9 have +~, - ~  successive price changes, but at 
different price levels. 
It can be argued that record 1 is at the bid at 192 , 2 is at the ask at 19¼, 
and 3 at the bid again. A similar pattern holds for 3 through 6. Note that 3 
is common to two streams. Ambiguity exists, therefore, about whether it is at 
the bid (for the previous stream with its associated ask at 19¼), or at the ask 
(with its bid at 12). Such ambiguous overlaps are discarded. Thus, headers 1 
through 3 and their associated data records are discarded. We therefore have 
two streams, each consisting of three non-overlapping reverting prices. 24 
Record 4 is a bid at 191, 5 is an ask at 19~, 6 a bid at 19½. Similarly for 7 
through 9. We can now impute the associated ask (bid) price that pertains to 
the data records. About 15 percent of the data records were discarded in this 
procedure to impute the bid/ask of the underlying stock. This may result in 
mispricing signals and hedge positions to be open for longer periods than 
they may have been on the option floor. A downward bias in the number of 
23A11 'consolidated' data records in which the lowest bid or transaction price was equal to the 
highest ask or transaction price were discarded. This condition obtains when all transactions in 
the options occurring within the time span of unchanging stock price are transacted at the same 
price, without any bid/ask price record occurring in that period. As a result, it is ambiguous 
whether the transactions were buy or sell transactions. 
24Only non-overlapping, consecutively reverting stock price record streams of three or more 
records are retained for the tests. 
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completed transactions initiated by mispricing signals and, correspondingly, 
an upward bias in the number of abandoned transactions also result, z5 
4.2. Data screens 
All data records which had zero volume at bolh the bid and the ask prices 
of the option were discarded, so that mispricing signals would not be flagged 
at zero volume. Further, all options either very deep-in-the-money [where 
Sbid /K > 1.30) or very deep-out-of-the-money [where Sbid,/K < 0 . 7 5 t  are 
discarded because the elasticity of prices for these options with respect to c~ is 
greatly different from the elasticity of those near the money. Finally, if the 
stock price remained unchanged for five minutes, or more, the data records 
were used only if they included at least one bid/ask record on the option in 
the 4 minutes 57 seconds interval described above. 2° This requirement was 
intended to ensure that qualifying records would be current and would not 
refer to prior stock price levels. 
Dividend and splits data were collected from Moody's  dividend record. 2~ 
Treasury bill rates matching with the option maturities are used for the 
riskfree rate. 28 The T-bill quotations were obtained from Interactive Data 
Corporation.  
5. Test hypotheses and trading strategies 
(1) For the immediate exercise lower bound the hypothesis is 
,':1 =~ Sask K - - C ~ k - - b  ~ 0 ,  (9) 
where b is the transaction cost. The trading strategy to profit from a 
mispriced call which does not satisfy (9) consists of buying the uuderpriced 
call, exercising it immediately, and selling the stock thus acquired. This 
involves a round trip transaction in the stock (once to exercise the option 
and the other to sell the stock so acquired), and one way in the call (to buy 
the call). The net profit will be Sb~ d - -K  C:,~k h, where Sh~a and Cas k a r e  the 
next available prices at non-zero trading volume, and h is zero for Case I; 
$5.50 for the arbitrageur (Case lI) and $16.75 for the option market maker  
(Case IlI). 
:SAvailability of bid/ask data on the optioned stocks would eliminate these biases. 
Unfortunately, to the best of my knowledge, such a data base is nol currently available. 
26See field (8) in footnote 19. 
2VSee footnote 6. 
28Although lending rate may differ from the borrowing rate, we use the T-bill rate for both. 
Investigation of the sensitivity of the results to this assumption is deferred to later work. 
M. Bhattacharya, Efficiency tests using CBOE transactions data 171 
(2) The European boundary condition may be stated as 
g2-=Sask-Ke-rr-~_D e r*i--Ca~k--b<--O. (10) 
t i - - -  
i 
The trading strategy to profit from a call which violates (10) consists of 
buying the call, shorting the stock and lending an amount equal to the sum 
of the present values of the exercise price and the expected dividends, and 
holding this portfolio till expiration. In the absence of bid/ask spreads and 
transaction costs, the realized profit from the hedge at expiration would be 
no less than the mispricing magnitude. In the presence of these market 
frictions, however, the magnitude and sign of the profit will depend on the 
stock price level at expiration. If S > K at maturity, the call will be exercised 
and the stock thus acquired returned to the lender with dividends and 
interest on the dividends. In this case the net profit equals the balance cash 
leftover when the initial position was established, i.e., Sbid- -Cask- -Ke  "~ 
- - ~ D , e  "~', plus interest thereon. Note that due to the execution lag 
assumed, the starting cash balance may be negative because the stock or the 
option prices may have moved in the interim. Therefore, call being in the 
money at maturity does not necessarily imply positive profits. If S < K ,  the 
call is not exercised. Instead, the stock is bought at S,sk and returned along 
with the dividend and interest thereon. In this case profit equals (K--S~.~k) 
plus the cash balance and interest thereon. The transactions in either case 
consist of buying the call and a round trip in the stock. Thus they are the 
same as in the previous test. 
It is clear that profits realized from the above hedge are not arbitrage 
profits, and that it is difficult to isolate the arbitrage component of the profit 
attributable to market inefficiency from that solely due to the stock price 
drift. An alternate strategy might be to create a riskless hedge using the 
neutral hedge ratio together with either continuous or discrete hedge position 
revisions. The neutral hedge ratio has to be computed according to some 
valuation model. Thus, incorporating neutral hedges with interim hedge 
revisions transforms a rational boundary condition test into a joint test of 
efficiency, the valuation model, and the parameter estimates used as input for 
the neutral hedge ratio computations. Furthermore, revising the hedge 
position at intermediate points is almost certain to eliminate the arbitrage 
opportunity on a net of transaction cost basis. Yet another approach may be 
to simply analyze the mispricing signals only arguing that market frictions 
are negligible [Galai (1978)]. In view of the even less palatable alternatives, 
the initially proposed trading strategy will be employed here. 
(3) The pseudo-American boundary condition may be stated as 
rti__ ~" O e ¢ r J ~ - C a s k - h < O .  t:3 = m a x  S a s k - -  g e j£~<i tz ] . = (11) 
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Other  than the additional requirement of determining the optimality of 
premature exercise at each ex-dividend date, this test parallels the European  
boundary  condit ion test. If the call is not  exercised prematurely,  despite ex- 
ante indication of such a possibility and its associated arbitrage profits, the 
profit from the position is calculated exactly as in the previous test. If 
premature exercise is optimal, the profit computa t ion  is analogous except 
that  the position is terminated at some ti instead of at T. 
(4) For  the call convexity test, the hypothesis is 
.7,,q. = Cask(K 2)  - -  qCbid(K 1) - -  ( 1 -- q)Cbid(K 3) -- b ~ 0. (12) 
If (12) does not hold, the trading strategy for arbitrage profits is to sell one 
contract  of the intermediate call and buy q and ( l - q )  contracts  for the 
lowest and highest exercise price calls, respectively. 
When transaction costs are non-negligible, magnitudes of total transaction 
cost and arbitrage profit will depend on the stock price level at expiration. It 
may  be cheaper for the spreader to reverse positions for options in-the- 
money at expiration than exercising them or having them exercised against 
him. That  would be the case if the opt ion transaction cost plus buying the 
opt ion at the ask, or selling it at the bid, together costs lower than the stock 
transaction cost. Table 1 presents the profit positions at expiration under 
such conditions. For  the zero transaction cost case, the arbitrage profit will 
at least equal the basis plus interest, that  is, A e '~. 
(5) Synchronizat ion of relative prices of two identical maturi ty  options 
with differing exercise prices on the same underlying stock requires that, for 
the second option, if (a) the market  bid price is greater than the model bid 
Table 1 
Profit positions at expiration for the call convexity test for non-zero 
transaction costs? 
S*>K3 (1-q)C*ia(K3) -C*k(Kz) +qC*~d(K ,) +Ae" -6B  
K3>S*>K2 - C * s k ( K 2 )  q-qC*id(K1) +Ae'~-5B 
K2>S*>KI  +qC~ia(K1) +Ae'~--4B 
S* < K l -A e " -  3 B 
aA e "~ ~ [(1 - q)C°,klK3)- C°~d(K 2) + qCO, k( K l)] e"~ represents the 
cash flow at the inception of the hedge and interest thereon. C O and 
C* are call prices at spread inception and at expiration, respectively. 
S* is the stock price at maturity; K 3 > K 2 > K I are the exercise prices 
for the identical maturity calls on the same underlying stock, and 
0 < q < l  is defined by K2-qK~+( I  q)K~. r is time from inception 
of spread to maturity. B is transaction cost/contract. For a market 
maker, it is assumed to be a $0.75/contract. 
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value, then the former should not also exceed its model ask value, or (b) the 
market ask price is less than the model ask value, then the former should not 
be less than its model bid value. That is, 
where 
= C  m a r k ¢ t - - C  m ° d e l < ~ o  i f  
g5 - -  bid 2 ask 2 ~--- 
- -  C market__ C model  ~> (~ if  
ask 2 bid 2 ~___'J 
C model _ F(Sbid  ' K 2  ' bid2 - -  T~r, Gbidl), 
C model __ F(Sask ' K2 ' T, r, tTaskl); ask2 - -  
C m a r k e t " ~ ( ~  model  
bid 2 f ~ b i d  2 , 
C market C model  
ask 2 ~ ask 2 , 
(13) 
dbidt and dask~ are obtained from (7) and (8), respectively, and F is the Black- 
Scholes formula with escrowed dividends. 
Implied standard deviations depend critically on the S/K ratio due to the 
non-linearity of the B-S formula in a. Therefore, if the model value for at- 
the-money or out-of-the-money calls are computed by using the implied a 
from a (deep) in-the-money call, they may be overestimated, thereby possibly 
generating a large signal to buy the former and sell the latter. To check for 
this valuation model dependent phenomenon a two step procedure was used 
to identify mispriced option pairs. First, the implied cr from the first option 
was used to compute model values for the second option in the pair. If a 
mispricing signal was detected from (13), the procedure was repeated with the 
option order reversed. That is, implied ~ from the second option was used to 
compute model values for the first option. If no confirmatory mispricing 
signal was detected in this direction, the previous signal was attributed to the 
valuation model (rather than to the market), and therefore discarded. The 
lesser of the absolute values of the two signals was taken to be the 
magnitude of relative mispricing for the option pair. Each call in the pair 
was tested for the possibility of premature exercise using the Roll (1977) 
condition for premature exercise. If either call violated this condition, the 
pair was discarded from further consideration. 29 Options of maturities of 
three weeks or less were not considered because the call values for such 
options are insensitive to o [Trippi (1977)]. When ex-dividend dates occur 
close to option maturity dates the psuedo-American option pricing formula 
is not a good approximation for an American option [Cox and Rubinstein 
(1983) and Galai (1977)]. Consequently, options with ex-dividend dates 
within three days of maturity date were excluded from the sample. 
The trading strategy to exploit relative mispricing of options, in this case, 
29While the Roll test is an attempt to ensure that the options in each pair have identical 
maturities, this outcome is not guaranteed. Unanticipated dividend or large stock price changes 
may lead to premature exercise. 
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consists of vertical spreads, either bearish or bullish. 3° The position hedge is 
the inverse of the neutral hedge ratios for the two options. 3t To compute the 
position hedge the B-S formula and the implied variances from the 
underpriced call will be employed. Since the hedge ratios will change with 
the stock price and with time, maintaining a riskless hedge implies 
continuous hedge revisions and the attendant infinite transaction costs. 
Instead, a more realistic fortnightly revision is assumed here. In so doing, the 
position ceases to be riskless and its return depends on the stock price drift 
and the frequency of the revisions. 32 Two related drawbacks of this test need 
to be mentioned. First, thc position is at risk until the second leg is executed. 
Next, the position is usually implemented by multiple contract long and 
short positions in the respective options to approximate the theoretical 
position ratio. That is, if the position ratio is 2.65 it may be approximated by 
an 8:3 ratio of long and short contracts, which yields a 2.667 position ratio. 
Therefore, even the hedged position is not totally riskless. Furthermore, 
multiple contracts increase the importance of the depth of the market. We 
will assume fractional contract trades with linear transaction costs. Since the 
final results will be reported in per contract short position, this 
approximation will not distort the results. 
6. Impact of stock drift on test results 
From the previous section it is clear that in the presence of market  friction 
only the immediate exercise test and the call convexity test are pure arbitrage 
tests. The other tests, namely, the European boundary test, the Pseudo- 
American boundary test, and the vertical spread test, depend to varying 
extent on the stock price drift. While it is recognized that option prices 
depend only on the underlying stock price movement,  because of the positive 
eovariance among stock returns it is useful to report the overall market  
movement  that occurred over the sample period for these tests. The Standard 
and Poor 500 index changed from 101.96 to 99.45 over the period. The range 
was from 107.83 to 97.15. There were exactly equal numbers of positive and 
negative daily returns in the period. For the two maturity series in the 
period, namely, Oct.-Jan. April and Nov. Feb.-May,  the S&P index values 
were 
Expiration datc S&P index Expiration date S&P index 
10/15/76 100.88 11/19/76 101.89 
01/20/77 102.97 02/18/77 100.49 
04/15/77 101.04 05/20/77 99.45 
3°A bearish (bullish) vertical spread is one in which the lower exercise price call is bought 
(written) and the other written (bought). Both options have the same maturity and are for the 
same underlying stock. 
3~See footnote 12. 
32Changes in a also necessitate hedge position revision. 
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This suggests that while stock price drift must still be taken into account 
when interpreting the results, the magnitude of the correction is unlikely to 
be very large for the rational boundary condition tests. However, for the 
vertical spread test, due to the infrequent hedge revisions, the impact of stock 
price drift is likely to be significant. 
7. Results: Boundary condition tests 
It may be useful to recall Galai's results for these tests. His data consisted 
of daily closing prices on stocks and their options for the 152 trading days 
from April 26, 1973, through November 30, 1973, covering 245 option series 
each with at least three days of data. His results, when the treasury bill rate 
was used for the risk free interest rate, are shown in panel A of table 2. Panel 
B reports our results. 
7.1. Immedia te  exercise bound 
For our study 86,137 observations pertaining to 706 option series met all 
the screening conditions described earlier. The 1,120 mispricing signals for 
1 ~ 0  ° /  this test under zero transaction cost assumption amounted to . . . . . .  o of the 
sample size compared to Galai's 1.72%. They represented 154 different option 
series. The signal magnitudes ranged from $6.25 to $50.00 per contract, with 
a median of $12.57/contract and an average of $12.03/contract contrasting 
with Galai's average of $35.00/contract. About 78°J~ of the signals were 
$12.50 or less per contract while only 18 signals exceed $25 per contract. 
Interestingly, 97)o of the signals were for options with less than 90 calendar 
days to maturity including 42°0, which were one week or less from maturity. 
No clear pattern emerged from the stock to strike price ratio associated with 
the signals nor by option class or by day of the week. The frequency of 
signals when standardized by trading volume did not increase nor decrease 
significantly with time, measured weekly and monthly. This suggests leveling 
off of the 'learning curve' claimed by traders during the CBOE's early days. 
The first leg of the trading strategy for this test consists of buying the call 
at the next available price with reported non-zero volume. In about 29')~, of 
the instances, price changes eliminated the profit signals before the first leg 
could be executed. Sixty percent of the 759 executed hedges were profitable, 
another 24% were even, that is, yielded zero profits while the balance were 
unprofitable. The average profit per executed hedge was $4.91/contract. 
Table 3 reports the distribution of mispricing signals and realized profits 
or losses from the executed hedges for the no transaction cost case. When the 
arbitrageur transaction cost of $5.50 is considered, the average loss is 
$0.59/contract. For the case of market maker with a transaction cost of 
$16.75 round trip, there were 146 signals which exceeded this transaction 
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Table 2 
Compar ison of results: Summary.  Panel A: Galai (1978, table 1), re=T-bil l ,  
zero transaction costs, no bid/ask spreads; panel B: this study, r r=T-bi l l .  
Immediate European Pseudo-American 
exercise "' '~ lower bound b'a lower bound c'd 
IA) 
Sample size 16,327 16,327 16,327 
Violation frequency 281 482 107 
Average violation 
per contract $35.00 $36,30 $41.70 
(B) 
Sample size 86,137 54,735 32,432 
Mispricing frequency 1,120 1,304 ~ .442 f 
Average mispricing 
per contract $12.57 $9.88 g $10,8U 
Number  of positions 
executed h 759 670 139 
Average profit per 
contract: Case P $4.91 $5.17 $8.20 
Case II id 0.59 - 6.98 8.26 
Case IIP 'j - 7 . 0 0  - 13.14 8.63 
"Hypothesis tested: c~ =- S,~k -- K -- C,~k < 0. 
hHypothesis tested: , ':2~Sa~k--Ke m ~D~ e . . . .  ( / a s k , ( 0 "  
CHypothesis tested: l:3=-maxi(S.~k Ke  r~'"-}~j.~D, e ~') C~k <O. 
dC:,,k and S,~k represent the ask prices of the call ~nd the underlying stock, 
respectively; K the exercise price; r the time to maturity; r the riskless rate; 
D the dividend amount ;  t the ex-dividend date; and rj the time to ex-dividend 
date j. 
~Counting one violation per option series per day. If all violations are 
counted, there were 2,823 additional violations. 
fSimilarly, there were 293 additional violations. 
~Based on the violations reported in the row above. 
hSee footnote g. The others could not be executed within the same day, or 
price changes eliminated the signal before it could be executed. See tables 3, 4 
and 5 for details. 
~Case l is zero transaction costs trader; Case II represents an arbitrageur: 
and Case IIl an option market maker. 
JCounting only those cases where the mispricing signals exceed the 
transaction cost. 
cost. The average loss per executed hedge was $7.00/contract net of 
transaction cost. 33 
Thus, only the zero transaction cost case displayed some evidence of 
arbitrage profits. The rule preventing shorting a stock on the downtick 
cannot explain away the cases where the mispricing signal is greater than 
33Forty-four of the signals were eliminated by price changes prior to execution. The 70 
profitable hedges averaged $1.29/contract while the 32 others resulted in an average loss of 
$25.15/contract net of transaction costs. 
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Table 3 
Distribution of mispricing signals and realized profits and losses for the immediate 





Frequency and magnitude of mispricing signals in 
S/contract 
0.01-6.25 6.26-12.50 12.51-25.00 >25.00 Total 
Losses in S/contract 
> 25.00 1 9 - -  1 11 
12.51-25.00 3 20 5 1 29 
6.2(~12.50 13 41 5 1 60 
0.01-6.25 l I 5 2 - -  18 
Subtotal loss 
frequency 28 75 12 3 118 
Even 41 125 16 1 183 
Profits in S/contract 
0.01-6.25 74 32 8 - -  114 
6.26-12.50 48 185 23 4 260 
12.51-25.00 11 36 28 1 76 
> 25.00 - -  2 3 3 8 
Subtotal profit 
frequency 133 255 62 8 458 
Total executed 202 455 90 12 759 
Unexecutedb 81 236 38 6 36l 
Total 283 691 128 18 1,120 
aHypothesis being tested is: e.~ ~ S a s k - K - C a s k ~ 0  , where Cas k and Sas k a re  the 
ask prices of the call and the underlying stock, and K is the exercise price of the 
call. The sample size is 54,735. 
bUnable to execute within the same day the mispricing signal occurred. 
point .  A p laus ib le  a l t e rna t e  e x p l a n a t i o n  for the exis tence  of  misp r i c ing  signals  
m a y  lie in the  different ial  t r a n s a c t i o n  costs  faced by par t i c ipan t s .  Reca l l  tha t  
m o r e  t h a n  4 2 ~  of  the  s ignals  had  one  week or  less to ma tu r i ty .  If these 
m o s t l y  d e e p - i n - t h e - m o n e y  o p t i o n s  were  he ld  by  inves tors ,  they  m a y  h a v e  
sold  the calls  at a d i s c o u n t  so as to a v o i d  h a v i n g  to exercise  t h e m  and  incur  
a r o u n d  t r ip  t r a n s a c t i o n  cost  in the  stock.  F o r  the  m o r e  real is t ic  cases wh ich  
c o n s i d e r e d  t r a n s a c t i o n  costs,  no  ev idence  c o n t r a r y  to o p t i o n  m a r k e t  
eff iciency was  found,  g iven  the d a t a  and  the t r ad ing  s t ra tegy.  
7.2. The European lower bound 
In  the  absence  of  i n t e r im  hedge  pos i t i on  rev is ions  a n d  in the p resence  of  
m a r k e t  f r ic t ions  a n d  an  e x e c u t i o n  lag, the  prof i t  f r o m  the  h e d g e d  pos i t i on  
c r ea t ed  to  exp lo i t  a v i o l a t i o n  o f  this b o u n d  will d e p e n d  on  the  s tock  pr ice  at 
ma tu r i t y .  There fo re ,  to d o c u m e n t  this prof i t  at  ma tu r i t y ,  as o p p o s e d  to 
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documenting mispricing at inception of the hedge, only those option series 
with expiration within the sample period were considered for this test)  4 
When multiple intra-day violations existed for the same series, the first 
violatio'n per option series per day was singled out for further analysis. 
There were 1,304 violations of this bound, or about 2.38% of the sample 
size of 54,735, for the zero transaction cost case. When the multiple intra-day 
violations were considered the frequency rose to 7.56'!; of the sample size. 
The average mispricing signal magnitude was $9.88/contract with a median 
of $7.12/contract. This compares with Galai's frequency of 2.95'!o and average 
magnitude of $36.30/contract (see tables 2 and 4}. 
Table 4 
Distribution of mispricing signals and realized profits and losses for the European 
boundary lest with zero Iransaction costs)' 
Vrequency and magnitude of mispricing signals in 
Realized $,'conl tact 
profit/loss . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
magnitude 0.01 6.25 6.26 12.50 12.51- 25.00 > 25.00 Total 
Losses in Scontract 
> 25.0(I 29 22 10 2 63 
12.51 25.00 61 31 14 6 112 
6.26 12.50 110 9 25 4 148 
0.01 6.25 27 74 22 2 125 
Subtotal loss 
frequency 227 136 71 14 448 
Even - 4 2 1 7 
Profits in S/contract 
0.01 6.25 46 7 52 6 1 I 1 
6.26 12.50 2 14 26 4 46 
12.51 25.00 9 2 13 7 31 
> 25.00 3 6 6 12 27 
Subtotal profit 
frequency 60 29 97 29 215 
Total executed 287 169 170 44 670 
Unexecuted b 210 106 107 33 456 
Signal reversal ~ 86 56 31 5 178 
Total 583 331 308 82 1,3(14 
"Hypothesis being tested is: ~:2 -= S,,k - K e r~_ ~ D,; e . . . .  C,,~ _< 0. where (",~ 
and S,~ k are the ask prices of the call and the underlying stock, respectively; K is 
the exercise price; z is the time to maturity; r is the riskless rate; D is the dividend 
amount; t is the ex-dividend date; and zj is the time to ex-dividend date .j. The 
sample size is 54,735. 
hUnable to execute within the same day the mispricing signal occurred. 
~Signal disappeared due to price correction before the first leg of the trading 
strategy could be executed. 
34Without this requirement the sample size would have remained at 86,137 analogous to 
Galai's identical samples for all tests. The latter approach is adequate only if bid/ask spreads 
and transaction costs are absent. In which case, effectively, onb  the mispricing signal is being 
studied without and with an execution lag. 
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Slightly more than half of the 1,304 signals could be executed within the 
same trading day, and resulted in losses twice as often as profits. The average 
profit was $5.17 excluding transaction costs. When a strategy of trying to 
execute mispricing signals in excess of transaction costs was adopted, the 
resulting executed positions averaged losses of $6.98 and $13.14 net of 
transaction costs for the arbitrageur and the option market maker, 
respectively. 
Here again only the zero transaction cost case yielded profits on the 
average, although loss making positions were twice as frequent as profitable 
positions. 
7.3. The pseudo-American lower bound 
Since the pseudo-American lower bound is identical to the European lower 
bound for options with no intervening dividends until maturity, the sample 
for this test was a subset of the sample for the European lower bound test. 
Thus there were 32,432 observations each with at least one dividend to 
maturity, and all observations pertained to option series maturing within the 
sample period. The results were essentially similar to those for the European 
bound, and are reported in tables 2 and 5. The frequency of violations was 
1.36~ of sample size with average magnitude $10.85/contract and a median 
of $8.77/contract. There were an additional 293 (or 0.903o of sample size) 
multiple intra-day violations. 
Two-thirds of the 442 signals could not be executed either due to prices 
changing prior to execution or due to the same day execution constraint 
imposed. Losses were about two and a half times as frequent as profits. 
Again the average profit of $8.20/contract for the no transaction case 
changed to losses of $8.26 and $8.63/contract net of transaction costs for 
Cases II and III, respectively. 
7.4. Call convexity test 
Only one violation of the call convexity test was found among the 1,006 
triplets of options with identical maturity, written on the same underlying 
stock. For the no transaction case, the mispricing magnitude was 
$6.25/contract. No further analysis is warranted in view of this strong result 
in support of the null hypothesis. 
7.5. Vertical spread test based on implied variance 
The criteria applied to data on call pairs for inclusion in the sample were 
that the calls have identical maturity; have different but close exercise prices; 
both should have traded during a time span when their common underlying 
stock price was unchanged; that their bid prices be unambiguously different 
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Table 5 
Distribution of mispricing signals and realized profits and losses for the pseudo- 




Frequenc~ and magnitude of mispricing signals in 
S/contract 
0.01 6.25 6.26-12.50 12.51 25.00 >25.00 Total 
Losses in S/contract 
> 25.00 13 2 -- - -  l 5 
12.51 25.00 12 q 1 - 22 
6.26-12.50 23 7 9 39 
0.01 -6.25 4 12 3 2 21 
Subtotal loss 
frequency 52 30 13 2 97 
Even 1 1 2 
Profits in $.'contract 
0.0l--6.25 2 2 I 1 1 16 
6.26- 12.50 11 2 13 
1251-25.00 3 1 3 3 10 
>25.00 - - -  I 1 
Subtotal profit 
frequency 5 3 25 7 40 
Total executed 57 34 39 9 139 
Unexecuted b 101 63 86 20 270 
Signal reversal ~ 17 10 4 2 33 
Total 175 107 129 31 442 
aHypothesis being tested is: ~:3~max~lS,~-Ke . . . .  ~ j ~ D t e  "9--C,~k<0, 
where C,~k and S~ k are the ask prices of the call and the underlying stock, 
respectively; K is the exercise price: r is the time to maturity; r is the riskless rate: 
D is the dividend amount: t is the ex-dividend date and rj is the time to ex- 
dividend date j. The sample size is 32,432. 
bUnable to execute within the same day the mispricing signal occurred. 
~Signal disappeared due to price correction before the first leg of the trading 
strategy could be executed. 
f r o m  t h e i r  a sk  p 6 c e s ;  t h a t  t he  t i m e  to  m a t u r i t y  be  l o n g e r  t h a n  t h r e e  weeks ;  
a n d  t h a t  n o  e x - d i v i d e n d  d a t e  s h o u l d  fall w i t h i n  t h r e e  d a y s  o f  t he  m a t u r i t y  
da te .  D e s p i t e  t he se  s t r i n g e n t  s c r een ings ,  m o r e  t h a n  51Vo of  t he  s a m p l e  of  
7,998 cal l  p a i r s  v i o l a t e d  t he  b o u n d s  for  t h i s  t es t  for  t he  ze ro  t r a n s a c t i o n  cos t  
case.  W h e n  o n l y  o n e  v i o l a t i o n  p e r  p a i r  pe r  d a y  was  c o u n t e d ,  1,444 v i o l a t i o n s  
(or  18"/; of  the  s a m p l e )  were  f o u n d .  T h e  m e a n  m i s p r i c i n g  m a g n i t u d e  was  
$ 3 3 . 8 4 / c o n t r a c t  a n d  the  m e d i a n  w as  $ 1 4 . 0 7 / c o n t r a c t .  A n  a d d i t i o n a l  187 
v i o l a t i o n s  were  n o t  c o n s i d e r e d  b e c a u s e  o n e  of  t he  cal ls  of  t h e  p a i r  c o u l d  h a v e  
b e e n  exe rc i sed  p r e m a t u r e l y ,  a c c o r d i n g  to  the  Rol l  (1977) test ,  t h e r e b y  
i n v a l i d a t i n g  t h e  a s s u m p t i o n  c r uc i a l  to  th i s  t es t  t h a t  the  cal l  p a i r  h a v e  
i d e n t i c a l  m a t u r i t i e s .  T h e  f r e q u e n c y  a n d  m a g n i t u d e s  of  t he  v i o l a t i o n  ( r e p o r t e d  
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in table  6) are especial ly surpr is ing  when c o m p a r e d  to those for the weak 
b o u n d a r y  condi t ion  tests repor ted  above.  Arb i t r age  profits realized from 
strategies suggested by the signals would  imply marke t  inefficiency, since 
marke t  efficiency requires that  no mechanica l  t rad ing  rule (even if based on a 
misspecified va lua t ion  model)  should  result in a rb i t rage  profits. 
Both legs of the spread  could  be executed within the day  in 849 of the 
1,444 'first v io la t ions  of the day '  ana lyzed  further. When  terminated ,  ei ther at 
ma tu r i ty  or  when price ad jus tments  e l iminated  the mispricing,  they resulted 
in an average profi t  of  $102.66/contract  of short  pos i t ion  in the overpr iced 
call. The 550 prof i table  and the 299 loss mak ing  spreads  averaged $296.80 
and $254.47/contract  of shor t  posi t ion,  respectively. The spreads  were revised 
an average of 1.38 times over their  lifetime. 
Realized profits  on the average being abou t  thrice as large as the 
mispr ic ing signal is very surpr is ing and may  be due to large drift c o m p o n e n t  
Table 6 
Distribution of mispricing signals and realized profits and losses for the implied 




Frequency and magnitude of mispricing signals in 
S/contract 
001-12.50 12.51-25.00 25.01-50,00 >50.00 Total 
Losses in S/contract 
> 100.00 56 28 15 65 164 
50.01 100.00 29 11 8 7 55 
25.01-50.00 24 7 4 6 4l 
0.01-25.00 23 7 5 4 39 
Subtotal loss 
frequency 132 53 32 82 299 
Profits in S/contract 
0.01-25.00 19 11 3 9 42 
25.01-50.00 27 8 4 3 42 
50.01-100.00 41 23 6 5 75 
> 100.00 145 70 53 123 391 
Subtotal profit 
frequency 232 112 66 140 550 
Total executed 364 165 98 222 849 
Unexecuted b 266 147 73 59 545 
Signal reversal c 37 7 4 2 50 
Total 667 319 175 283 1,444 
aSample size is 7,998. Spread revised at least two weeks after inception or 
previous revision. 
bUnable to execute within the same day the mispricings occurred. Includes cases 
where only one leg could be executed within the same day. 
cSignal disappeared prior to execution of either leg. 
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impact on the final outcome. Investigating this conjecture, we found that in 
both the signals and the executed spreads, bearish spreads were nearly five 
times as frequent as bullish spreads. About half of the 139 bullish spreads 
executed were profitable while two-thirds of the 710 bearish spreads executed 
were profitable. Spreads with April 1977 expirations showed that profitable 
bearish spreads outnumbered loss making bearish spreads by 315:43 or 
greater than 7:1 while the bullish spreads were evenly divided. The January 
1977 expirations also exhibited results along the same lines although not so 
pronounced (198:154 bearish spreads and 22:18 bullish spreads, profitable to 
unprofitable ratio}. 
From the above we conclude that the B S model dependent implied 
variance test provides tighter boundary conditions on relative call prices. 
More than half the call pairs violated these tighter bounds and the average 
mispricing magnitude seemed large enough to overcome the transaction costs 
for trading in calls alone. However, the execution strategy was not an 
adequate approximation of a riskless position and therefore the results 
depended largely on the drift of the stock prices between spread creation and 
tcrmination date. 
Before concluding, the shortcomings of the paper need to be discussed. By 
working only with the widest band of the available bid/ask spread the tests 
have been biased in favor of the null hypotheses. Not doing so would have 
meant working with trades inside the bid/ask spread without unambiguously 
knowing whether a trade was initiated by a buy order or a sell order, 
resulting in ambiguous conclusions. In limiting trades to next available prices 
rather than at the mispricing signals themselves, the time taken to execute a 
hedge may be overstated, thereby biasing the tests in favor of the null 
hypotheses, It is conceivable that a market maker recognizes a mispriced 
option and trades immediately. For a researcher studying past data to do so 
would imply an cx-post selection bias. Finally, when imputing a bid/ask 
spread on the stock from its transaction prices a significant fraction of the 
data, about 15'I,,, is discarded. Although this still retains data on the average 
of over 30,000 raw records per day, not imputing the bid/ask would have 
meant obtaining a stock bid/ask data base, which does not exist presently. 
8, Conclusions 
Four rational boundary condition tests were performed on CBOE traded 
calls using transactions data, considering the bid/ask of the calls and the 
stock, the depth of the market, execution lag and transaction costs. Small 
and infrequent violations of the boundaries were reported. However, the 
returns resulting from executed hedges were on average positive only when 
transaction costs are ignored. 
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The B-S model dependent vertical spread test based on implied variances 
of simultaneously traded identical maturity call pairs uncovered frequent 
violations of the tighter bounds imposed by this joint test. While the 
proposed strategy was an inadequate approximation of a riskless spread 
position, the question remains whether increased transaction costs due to 
more frequent revisions, search costs, opportunity cost of market makers' 
seat and time 35 are smaller than the indicated average mispricing magnitude. 
Appendix 
Table A. 1 
Stock price summary records for Black & Decker for October 26, 1976. 
Number of 
Record no. Stock price Begin time" End time a raw records b 
l 19-5/8 9:08:37 10:12:19 56 
2 19-3/4 10:13:28 10:33:20 10 
3 l 9-5/8 10:40:08 10:52:13 7 
4 19-1/2 10:53:05 11:12:27 12 
5 19-5/8 11:23:41 11:30:28 16 
6 19-1/2 13:31:21 14:07:03 16 
7 19-3/4 14:09:13 14:09:13 1 
8 19-5/8 14:31:12 14:31:37 4 
9 19-3/4 14:46:45 14:59:50 14 
~The stock price was unchanged during the time span from begin time to 
end time. Time in hours, minutes and seconds. 
bRaw records are either bid/ask changes or option trades in any one of 
the options written on the underlying stock, Fifty-six such records occurred 
between 9:08:37 and 10:12:19. 
Table A.2 
List of optioned stocks in the data. 












Aluminum Co. of America 
American Electric Power 
American Hospital Supply 
AMP, Inc. 
Avon Products, Inc. 
Boise Cascade Corp. 
Black & Decker Mfg. Co, 
Burroughs Corp. 
Burlington Northern, Inc, 
CBS, Inc. 
Colgate Palmolive 
~SSee footnote 17. 
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Table A.2 (continued) 































































































Commonwealth Edison Co. 
Delta Airlines, Inc. 
Fluor Corp. 
Citicorp 
Federal National Mortgage Assn. 
General Electric Co. 
General Foods 
Holiday Inns, Inc. 
Honeywell, Inc. 
International Harvester Co. 
International Business Machines Corp. 
International Flaw~r & Fragrances, Inc. 
International Minerals & Chemical Corp. 
International Paper Co. 
International Telephone & Telegraph Co. 
Johns Manville Corp. 
Jim Walter Corp. 
Kresge Co. 
Kerr-McGee Corp. 
Kennecott Copper Corp. 
Loew's 
McDonald's Corp. 
Merrill Lynch & Co., Inc. 
MGIC Investment 
Minnesota Mining & Mfg, 
Merck & Co., Inc. 
Monsanto Co. 
NCR Corp. 
Northwest Airlines, Inc. 




Reynolds (R.J.) Industries, Inc. 
Skyline Corp. 
Standard Oil Co, (IN) 
Southern Co. 
Sperry Rand Corp. 
Texas Gulf Inc. 
Tesoro Petroleum 
Texas Instruments, Inc. 
UAL, inc. 
Upjohn Co. 
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